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Strategic option pricing1
Volker Bieta2, Udo Broll3, Wilfried Siebe4
Abstract : In this paper an extension of the well-known binomial approach to option 
pricing is presented. The classical question is: What is the price of an option on the 
risky asset? The traditional answer is obtained with the help of a replicating portfolio 
by ruling out arbitrage. Instead a two-person game from the Nash equilibrium of which 
the option price can be derived is formulated. Consequently both the underlying as-
set’s price at expiration and the price of the option on this asset are endogenously de-
termined. The option price derived this way turns out, however, to be identical to the 
classical no-arbitrage option price of the binomial model if the expiration-date prices 
of the underlying asset and the corresponding risk-neutral probability are properly 
adjusted according to the Nash equilibrium data of the game.
Keywords : option pricing, game theory, Nash equilibrium.
JEL codes : G12, G13, C72.
Introduction
Traditional option pricing is based on the assumption that risk management 
is a single person decision game. Alternatively it could be said that it is a game 
against nature. The idea behind this concept is that price movements are assumed 
to be governed by exogenously given event uncertainties. The price movements 
are independent of all actions of other decision makers. The consequences are 
clear. Because the outcome is not affected by actions of the agents it is a matter 
of stochastical and statistical techniques to calculate the probabilities of potential 
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outcomes. That is what Markowitz (1952) based stochastic risk management is all 
about. In this note the no-arbitrage equilibrium is replaced by a Nash equilibrium.5
Game theory is a major field of economic theory. It deals with decision-
making of rational agents. A game is an abstract which is defined as a formal 
description of a strategic (interactive) situation that encompasses players, strat-
egies and payoffs. Games are everywhere. The benefit of using game theory is 
at least twofold. Firstly, game theory is a method for better understanding the 
rules of a game and for finding the optimal strategy in a given market setting. 
Secondly, game theory can help to structure and shape interactions with a view 
to steer and influence the behaviour of other players towards a desirable out-
come. The strategic view is essential in decision making. A Nash equilibrium 
is a stable situation where all players are making the best choice they can, giv-
en the choices of their rivals. It is important to find whether a best strategy for 
a given game exists. Therefore knowledge in game theory ensures more insight 
into the true nature of the real driving forces of the financial dynamic. Finding 
the right strategies and making the right decisions improve decision-making 
sustainability. One basic intention of the presented note is to separate the prob-
lem of the valuation of payoffs from the analysis of strategic interaction.
The study formulates and solves an extension of the well-known binomial 
approach to option pricing for the single-period case (see, e.g., Black & Scholes, 
1973; Cox, Ross, & Rubinstein, 1979). Hence a two-date, two-asset, two-state 
economy as the starting point is taken. There is one risky asset and one risk-free 
asset whose initial price and rate, respectively, is exogenously given. The state 
of the economy at the second date is chosen according to a binomial distribu-
tion the parameter of which is also given exogenously. The final or end-of-pe-
riod price of the risky asset is state-dependent. It is customary to express this 
price in terms of the initial price. These end-of-period prices are considered as 
a date of the economy. They are not affected by actions of market participants. 
The classical option pricing question in this framework is: What is the time-
zero price of an option on the risky asset? The traditional answer is obtained 
with the help of a replicating portfolio by ruling out arbitrage.
Instead it is assumed that, unlike the traditional approach, there is indeed 
an impact on the end-of-period prices by interdependent actions of market 
participants. Hence a two-person game from the Nash equilibrium is formu-
lated from which the option price can be derived. Consequently both the un-
derlying asset’s price at expiration and the price of the option on this asset are 
endogenously determined. The game-theoretic option price derived this way 
turns out, however, to be identical to the classical no-arbitrage option price of 
the single-period binomial model if the expiration-date prices of the underly-
ing asset and the corresponding risk-neutral probability are properly adjusted 
 5 For using game theory to model option pricing from a strategic point of view see Rubinstein 
(1991), Thakor (1995), Ziegler (2010) and Bieta, Broll and Siebe (2014).
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according to the Nash-equilibrium data of the game. In this sense the model 
of the paper can be considered as an extension of the classical binomial frame-
work opening the latter for interpersonal decision making.
Before beginning the mathematical part of the paper two possible applica-
tions of the research are briefly discussed. Firstly, a “pension fund, life insur-
ance”—scenario is referred to (i). After that, a “shareholder; bondholder con-
flict”—scenario (ii) is outlined.
(i) Consider a classical life insurance contract with a one-off payment. Suppose 
the contract is a with-profits policy. That is to say the policyholder partici-
pates in the return generated by the insurer’s investment portfolio, often 
up to 80%. In addition the insurance company or pension fund usually 
guarantees the insured a minimum rate of return on his or her capital in-
vestment. Hence the insurance company or the company’s shareholders 
respectively, completely bear the risk of the rate of return on their invest-
ment portfolio falling short of the guaranteed rate.
From an options angle the following picture unfolds: The buyer of the 
insurance policy gets a share in the company’s investment portfolio and 
an option on the portfolio’s rate of return, the exercise price of which is 
the guaranteed rate of return; i.e., in case the portfolio’s rate of return falls 
short of the guaranteed rate on the date of maturity the policyholder’s im-
plicit or embedded option will automatically be exercised by transferring 
the guaranteed amount stipulated in the contract to the policyholder’s ac-
count. In other words the insurance buyer makes a one-off investment and 
hedges this investment with a put option sold by the insurance company.
The insurance company and the insured have divergent interests. The 
insurance buyer prefers a high-risk investment portfolio in contrast to the 
preferences of the insurance company and their shareholders who prefer 
a rather low-risk portfolio. The reason for this divergence of preferences 
can be found in the asymmetric participation of the company and the poli-
cyholder in rates of return both above and below the guaranteed rate, with 
the company only participating in the surplus with 20% and fully partici-
pating in rates of return below the guaranteed rate.
There are two aspects that relate this situation to the paper’s highly styl-
ized model. First, the insurance company is able to pursue their interests 
by independently choosing the investment strategy. This way the insur-
ance company as seller of the (implicit) put option affects the underlying 
value on the maturity date; i.e., the rate of return on the investment port-
folio. Moreover the insurer has to avoid the peril of mispricing the insur-
ance contract by paying too little attention to this implicit option. The in-
surance premium has to take the price of the embedded put option into 
account. Thus the insurance company will be interested in the maximum 
price they can charge for this implicit option, bearing in mind that a pro-
spective insurance buyer will not accept any surcharge. The paper’s general 
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framework can be adapted to capture this situation, eventually resulting 
in an interactively computed maximum surcharge.
(ii) Consider a partly leveraged company. Of course the company’s debt is not 
risk-free: In case of default the ownership of the company would pass from 
the shareholders to the bondholders due to shareholders’ limited liability.
From an options angle the following picture now unfolds: The bond-
holders implicitly have sold a put option on the company’s value to the 
shareholders, with the face value of the debt plus necessary interest as 
the exercise price. However the shareholders solely decide on the invest-
ment strategy. Hence in this case it is the buyer of the option who is able 
to affect the underlying value on the expiration date; i.e., the company’s 
value on the bonds’ date of maturity. There are again divergent interests: 
Shareholders are willing to assume high-risk projects, thereby aiming at 
enhancing the value of equity, whereas the bondholders generally prefer 
a  less risky investment policy. The lenders to the company should take 
care of a surcharge on the bond’s coupon payments or should think of an 
additional lump-sum charge in order to account for the put option which 
they are implicitly selling to the shareholders. Of course the shareholders 
will not accept any surcharge. Therefore the lenders will be interested in 
the maximum price they can charge for this implicit option. The paper’s 
general framework, when properly adapted to this situation, will eventu-
ally produce an interactively computed maximum surcharge.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 1 delineates the stand-
ard approach of option pricing for the binomial case, i.e., the no-arbitrage equi-
librium. Section 2 develops the concept of strategic option pricing. The main 
result is derived. In Section 3 we further shed light on the properties of the so-
lution. The final section concludes.
1. The no-arbitrage equilibrium
A call option is a right to buy one unit of the underlying asset at the strike price 
at the expiration date. In economics a right is characterized by a positive price. 
What is the market price of the option considered? In this section the standard 
approach of option pricing.6 briefly reviewed There are two basic components 
to be taken into consideration: the concept of perfect arbitrage and the no ar-
bitrage principle. This model is used to determine the current option price C. 
All prices of the underlying stock are assumed to be publicly known, i.e. the 
current stock price S and the future stock price S1.
 6 For more information, see Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993), Wong, Filbeck & Baker 
(2015), Broll & Wong (2017).
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A simple stochastic process is the binomial process. In the binomial world 
the stock price moves up and down over time, but the stock price can take only 
two outcomes at t = 1.
 1
(1 )
(1 )
S u S
S
S d S
+
−
 = += 
= +
 (1)
where u = percentage increase (up) of the stock price in t = 1 with u > 0 and d 
percentage decrease (down) of the stock price in t = 1 with −1 ≤ d < 0. It is as-
sumed that the states are known to all participants in the market place.
Comparable to S1 the expiration price of the call option can take two out-
comes only
 11
1
   
   
C if S S
C
C if S S
+ +
− −
 == 
=
 (2)
The expiration price (2) is the larger of zero and the difference between the 
stock price at the expirations date and the strike price X:
 C1 = max{S1 − X, 0} (3)
The basic idea of perfect arbitrage portfolios is as follows: It is possible to 
compose a portfolio consisting of the underlying stock and a risk free bond 
that perfectly matches the future cash flows of the option. As a result in a no 
arbitrage situation the option must have the same current price as the arbitrage 
portfolio. In other words a perfect arbitrage portfolio is a combination of se-
curities that perfectly replicates the future cash flows of the derivative security.
The next step is to calculate the optimal combination of the underlying stock 
and the risk free bond in the perfect arbitrage portfolio at t = 0. Assuming 
a bond price of one, the volume of the bond investment is F and the risk free 
rate is r, with u > r > 0 > d. The volume of the stock investment is the product 
of the number of stocks Y times the stock price S. The result is SY.
In the simple binomial world a no arbitrage equilibrium holds if the follow-
ing conditions are satisfied at t = 1:
 S +Y + (1 + r)F = C + (4a)
 S −Y + (1 + r)F = C −  (4b)
From (4a) and (4b) we get:
 
( )
C CY
u d S
+ −−
=
−
 (5)
123V. Bieta, U. Broll, W. Siebe, Strategic option pricing
 1 (1 ) (1 )
(1 ) ( )
d C u CF
r u d
+ −+ − +
=
+ −
 (6)
The present value of (4a) and (4b) is given by:
 SY + F = C * (7)
From (5) and (6) we calculate the current option price:
 ( )1* * (1 *)(1 )C q C q Cr
+ −= + −
+
 (8)
where:
 *
r dq
u d
−
=
−
 (9)
and:
 1 *
u rq
u d
−
− =
−
 (10)
The probabilities (9) and (10) are called quasi-probabilities or risk neutral 
probabilities. For the remainder of the discussion without a loss of generality 
S = 1 is assumed.
In contrast to Cox and others (1979) (in the following CRR), in this model 
(Section 2) the two possible expiration date prices are not exogenously given. 
The seller sets the expiration prices endogenously according to his strategic 
goals. In other words, the seller is representing the market thus giving up the 
assumption of exogenously given market prices. On the opposite side of the 
market, the buyer is making strategic investment decisions in both the under-
lying and the financial option. In order to determine the outcome of the strate-
gic interaction of the players the Nash equilibrium is adopted. The Nash equi-
librium is the generally accepted concept when it comes to strategic decision 
making (Rubinstein, 1991).
2. The non-cooperative equilibrium
This section develops the concept of strategic option pricing. The case of a call 
option for a single period horizon as analysed in Section 1 is still considered. 
However the option seller is now setting the prices of the underlying in both 
states along the lines of strategic reasoning. In addition probabilities to the 
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states up and down are assigned. The state u occurs with the probability q and 
the state d occurs with the probability 1 − q. The risk free rate is r. As an addi-
tional constraint we assume u > r > 0 > d > −1.
An individual investor (the buyer) who can choose from two alternatives 
at t = 0 denoted by (i) B: to buy the stock at the rate r and (ii) NB: not to buy 
the stock is considered.
Assuming the outcome in the state u is equal to (1 + u) and in the state d 
the outcome is equal to (1 + d) it is found that buying the stock means choos-
ing the lottery LB = [(u − r), (d − r); q, (1 − q)]. Alternatively not buying results 
in choosing a degenerated lottery with a sure payoff of zero. It is assumed that 
the buyer is risk neutral and, consequently, the buyer is planning to maximize 
the expected payoff.
Now the seller enters the stage and offers the buyer to decide on buying or 
not buying the stock when the financial market state will be disclosed at t = 1. 
This comes to offering the buyer a call option with the strike price X = 1 + r. 
For the buyer holding this option means being in the situation of the lottery 
L* given by
 L* = [(u − r), 0; q, (1 − q)]. (11)
L* is labelled the (call) option lottery. What is the maximum premium the 
buyer is willing to pay for this option?
First, the prices of the underlying are no more predetermined as the seller 
is able to set these prices. In other words the seller decides what prices the un-
derlying will take at the expiration date t = 1. It is assumed that the set of strat-
egies of the seller, A, is given by:
 A = {a : max{r − u, |d| − 1} ≤ a ≤ r − d} (12)
If the seller chooses any a ∈ A, then S1, the value of the underlying at the 
end of the period, takes on one of the two possible values
 1
( ) 1 ( )
( ) 1 ( )
S a u a
S
S a d a
+
−
 = + += 
= + +
 (13)
To keep the model still simple only consider a 1-dimensional price strategy 
for the seller is considered. A price change specific to each state (u(+) or d(−)) 
does not come under consideration. More formally in this model the seller only 
chooses a = a+ = a− instead of a+ ≠ a−.
There are three types of possible strategies: The choice of a = 0 means choos-
ing inactivity, which is the roulette situation. Now the market exclusively de-
termines the prices of the underlying in both states. Alternatively a > 0 means 
the choice of a price increasing strategy for the underlying. The price of the 
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underlying will be raised in both states of the market. Finally, a < 0 means the 
choice of a price reducing strategy. The price of the underlying will be cut in 
both states. Condition (12) prevents negative prices occurring.
By assumption the buyer cannot observe the seller’s choice. Both the buyer 
and the seller are assumed to be risk neutral. The seller’s expected payoff de-
pends on which alternative the buyer will choose at t = 0 in the absence of the 
call option offer. The payoff to the seller is assumed to be the difference of the 
expected value of the call option lottery and the buyer’s expected payoff giv-
en alternative actions. The implicit assumption is that the seller is a premium 
maximizer.
Hence, the expected payoff to the buyer playing his/her (pure) strategy B 
(or NB) is given by:
 A2(a, B) = q((u + a) − r) + (1 − q)((d + a) − r) (14)
 A2(a, NB) = 0 (15)
Referring to the buyer’s choice at t = 0 and noting that E* is the fair value of 
L* what means that the seller does not offer L* for a price smaller than E* the 
expected payoff to the seller is given by:
 A1(a, B) = E*
 − A2(a, B) (16)
 A1(a, NB) = E* (17) 
Let the expected payoff of the option lottery L* be denoted by E*, i.e.:
 E* = q((u + a) − r) (18)
 A1(a, B) = (1 − q)(r − (d + a)) is obtained (19)
and
 A1(a, NB) = q((u + a) − r) (20) 
The preceding setting is referred to as the one period hypothetical op-
tion game with risk neutral agents. Next the question is asked: What choice 
of a ∈ A will be made by the seller when aiming at a maximum premium for 
the call option?
First, the seller will take into consideration that his/her choice of increas-
ing or reducing the price of the underlying will be reflected by the action the 
buyer will decide upon at t = 0 given the choice a. Second it can be observed 
that in equilibrium the buyer will randomize between his/her two actions if
126 Economics and Business Review, Vol. 6 (20), No. 3, 2020
 10 rq
u d
+
< <
−
 (21)
holds true for the exogenously given probability q of the state u.
The intuition is as follows: Suppose to the contrary that the buyer in equi-
librium chooses a pure strategy, that is to say, his/her equilibrium choice were 
either B or NB: (i) say, it were B. In equilibrium the choice of the seller must be 
a best reply to the choice of the buyer. It can be concluded from (19) that the 
seller’s choice must be a = |d| − 1 or a = r − u, (ii) now say, the buyer’s equilib-
rium choice were NB. Then, (20) demonstrates that the seller’s best response 
is a = r − d and (iii) however, in either case it is easy to see that the respective 
choice of the buyer is not an optimal answer to the seller’s choice of the value 
of the underlying. This, however, must be the case in equilibrium: If, for in-
stance, the equilibrium choice of the seller was a = |d|−1 or a = r −u, then the 
buyer’s best response is, according to (14) and (15), given by NB.
Note that in this case according to (14), the buyer’s payoff is given by 
A2(|d| − 1, B) = q(u − d) − (1 + r) or A2(r − u, B) = (1 − q)(d − u). We con-
clude that A2(|d| − 1, B) < A2(|d| − 1, NB) must hold true (see (21)). Thus, nei-
ther (|d| − 1, B) nor (r − u, B) can be an equilibrium. If, on the other hand, the 
equilibrium choice of the seller was a = r − d, then the buyer’s best response 
is, according to (14) and (15), given by B: The payoff to the buyer at NB equals 
A2(r−d, NB). It is concluded that A2(r − d, NB) < A2(r − d, B) (see (21)) or 
A2(r − u, B) < A2(r − u, NB) must hold true. Thus (r − d, NB) cannot be an 
equilibrium.
As a result it is known that in equilibrium the buyer will employ a mixed 
strategy. Each of his/her alternatives must generate the same payoff to him/
her in equilibrium, for otherwise he/she could do better by not randomizing 
and choosing a pure strategy instead, that is to say, by choosing either B or NB. 
Therefore in equilibrium it must hold true that:7
 A2(a*, B) = A2(a*, NB) (22)
with a* denoting the seller’s equilibrium strategy. From this we obtain:
 a* = r − (qu + (1 − q)d) (23)
If the seller employs his/her equilibrium strategy, then the value of the un-
derlying at the end of the period, S1, takes on one of the following two values 
(see (13)):
 1
( *) (1 ) (1 )( )
( *) (1 ) ( )
S a r q u d
S
S a r q d u
+
−
 = + + − −= 
= + + −
 (24)
 7 See (i) Section 3 for an argument that a* is indeed the best reply of the seller to the mixed 
equilibrium strategy of the buyer.
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Furthermore, from (22) we conclude that:
 A1(a*, B) = A1(a*, NB) (25)
must hold true. In particular:
 A1(a*, B) = E* − A2(a*, NB), (26)
which gives:
 A1(a*, B) = q(1 − q)(u − d) (27)
Discounting (27) gives the strategically determined option premium:
 1 (1 )( )
1s
C q q u d
r
= − −
+
 (28)
Now, recall that the quasi-probability in the one period option pricing for-
mula q*, is given by (see (9)):
 * r dq
u d
−
=
−
 (29)
The CRR quasi-probability of the single period case, q*, satisfies condition 
(21) if the borderline case d = −1 is excluded. In particular, if the exogenous-
ly given probability for the state u, q, equals q*, we conclude from (28) that:
 1 ( )
1s
r dC u r
r u d
− = − + − 
 (30)
must hold true. Furthermore, the no-arbitrage pricing formula derived in CRR 
entails for the single period case the option premium:
 
1* *( )
1
C q u r
r
= −
+
 (31)
Drawing a comparison with (8) it can be seen that C + = u − r and C − = 0 
must hold in addition. Thus the main result is obtained.
Proposition. The strategic option premium of the one period option game with 
risk neutral agents equals the single period no-arbitrage premium if, and only 
if, the exogenously given probability for the state u equals the quasi-probabil-
ity in the one period option pricing formula, i.e. Cs = C*, if and only if q = q*.
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3. Properties of the solution
In this section further details of the solution are given. Some of the features are 
helpful in understanding the model´s rationale.
(i) Recall that the buyer in equilibrium chooses a mixed strategy denoted by 
Y * = (y *, 1 – y *). As the buyer chooses B with the probability y * y * = q 
(32) is obtained According to max{r − u, |d| − 1} < a* < r − d the seller’s 
equilibrium choice a* is an interior solution. A1(a, Y *) denotes the expected 
payoff of the seller given the mixed strategy of the buyer. Then observe that 
a
∂
∂
A1(a, Y *) is constant and conclude from a
∂
∂
A1(a, Y *) that (32) holds.
(ii) In case 1 > q > (r + 1)/(u − d) and max{r − u, |d| − 1} = |d| − 1 hold true, 
(|d| − 1, B) constitutes a Nash equilibrium. With (19) it can be seen that the 
seller’s best response to B is a = |d| − 1. Then (14) and (15) illustrate that 
B is the buyer’s best response to |d| − 1 if, and only if, q[(u + |d| − 1) − r] 
+ (1 − q)[(d + |d| − 1) − r] > 0 holds true. The latter is the case if, and only 
if, q > (r + 1)/(u − d) holds true. The result is q > q* since d − 1; the quasi-
probability in the one period option pricing formula by CRR allows of the 
representation q* = (r − d)/(u − d). However, plausible values of r, u and d 
imply (r + 1)/(u − d) > 1. Hence a necessary condition for (|d| − 1, B) be-
ing a Nash equilibrium of the one period hypothetical option game is not 
satisfied in general. Thus condition (21) is not very restrictive.
(iii) In case 1 > q > (r + 1)/(u − d) holds but max{r − u, |d| − 1} equals r − u (in-
stead of |d| − 1), then neither (r − u, B) nor (r − d, NB) can be a Nash equi-
librium. Again, the equilibrium is given by (a*, Y *) (see (23), (32)).
(iv) Given that q fulfils (21) it can be seen that Cs = C*
 holds if and only if q 
equals the risk neutral probability q* (assuming |d| < 1). The distinguish 
the cases (a) q* > 0.5 and (b) q* < 0.5 are distinguished. In case (a) it can 
be observed that Cs > C *
 holds if, and only if, 1 − q* < q < q* is valid. In 
case (b) we obtain Cs > C *
 if, and only if, q* < q < 1 − q* is true. If q* = 0.5 
holds then the result is Cs < C *
 for all q q*.
(v) Again q is satisfying (21) is assumed. Given q = q* the result a* = 0 is ob-
tained. The result can be described as follows: If the exogenously given 
expectation of state u is identical with the CRR quasi-probability of state 
u it is found that the seller is completely passive. He/she is accepting the 
exogenously given expiration date prices without considering any change.
(vi) As above q fulfils (21) is assumed. The expiration date prices of the un-
derlying are (1 + u + a*) and (1 + d + a*) in states u and d respectively. 
Calculating the CRR quasi-probability, q˜* q˜* = (r − d − a*)/(u − d) is 
found. As a result the CRR premium C ̃ * = q(1 − q)(u − d)/(1 + r) is deter-
mined. Alternatively it can be said that the strategic option premium, Cs, is 
identical with the CRR premium taking care of the adjusted data situation.
129V. Bieta, U. Broll, W. Siebe, Strategic option pricing
Conclusion
In this study a one period option pricing game is developed and presented. If 
the buyer of a call option bets on what will happen and the seller of a call op-
tion decides what happens, then, without a doubt, insight into the true nature 
of openness (risk) is required. Given the strategic behaviour of both the sell-
er and the buyer of a call option two results are presented. Firstly it has been 
shown how the seller’s maximum premium is calculated. Secondly it is we dem-
onstrated that in a specific strategic setting and in the non-strategic Cox and 
others (1979) setting, the results are the same, if the objective probabilities for 
the states of the world and the so-called CRR risk neutral probabilities for the 
states of the world are the same.
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